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ABSTRACT 
 
 
In the last decade, the U.S. government has spurred efforts to boost the utilization of 
transportation electrification technologies, because of their low-pollution emissions, energy 
independence, and high fuel economy. An ever-increasing number of electric and plug-in 
electric vehicles (EVs and PEVs) will radically change the traditional view of the transportation 
industry, social environment, and business world. Research on grid integration of EVs and 
PEVs typically addresses topics at the vehicle-grid boundary such as peak load impacts and 
optimal charging control. While researchers around the world are making significant advances 
in these areas, there is very little work investigating the customer behavior in competitive EV 
charging and parking services. On one hand, as a transportation tool and electricity carrier, EV 
can be charged at any charging facility and at any time, which brings spatial and temporal 
demand uncertainty to the service providers. On the other hand, the retail electricity price and 
parking fee may have an impact on customer behavior, eventually leading to a change in the 
expected profits of the service providers. In this thesis, the dynamic interactions between 
service providers and customers are studied and modeled using game theory. In the 
abovementioned competition, the players decide their own strategies (i.e., retail electricity price, 
parking fee, and rebate) while considering a variety of physical constraints such as transformer 
capacity. The customer segmentation is also taken into consideration. More specifically, the 
competitive market is studied using a non-cooperative Bertrand game. Case studies 
demonstrate the accuracy, and effectiveness of the proposed solution algorithms
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1. Background 
Electric Vehicles are growing in popularity as a solution of higher power efficient and low 
emission alternative to the fuel based conventional vehicles driven by internal combustion 
engines[1]. Driven by the consuming of natural fossil fuel reserves and rising petrol costs, 
governments of various countries have regulated policy to adopt more sustainable technologies 
such as electric vehicles[2], thus Original Equipment Manufacturers such as Ford and GM have 
already begun to roll out plug-in electric vehicles from their product lines with many more 
companies promising to expand their business into the electric vehicle market0. Higher 
penetration of electric vehicle in the market will bring both challenges and opportunities to the 
existing power grid system0. Besides the challenges it will bring to the demand side 
management system, the potential contribution of EVs to the peak-valley shifting also cannot 
be ignored[5]. EV charging and parking facilities, as an interface between utility companies 
and EV owners, will contribute to both of the aspects stated above. 
The relationship between EVs and EV charging/parking decks are similar conventional 
vehicles and gas stations0. A parading shift is shown in Fig. 1 as well as the comparison 
between these two features. Considering the EVs need to be charged and as more and more 
charging facilities are installed in parking decks, these decks could be the interface between 
the EVs and the utility grid and could be seen as agents of the utility company used to control 
the charging scenarios. As a result of increase of EV number and development of EVs, it could 
be foreseen that there would also be an explosive increase in EV charging/parking deck’s 
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number0 
Though there are many things that EV charging facilities have in common with the gas 
station, differences between the behavior of EV customers and conventional vehicle owners 
can’t be ignored, studies about competition among gas stations may not be applicable to EV 
charging/parking decks. Herein, we consider the game between decks that will deal with 
customers of different response to the price changes0. 
1.2. Objective and System framework 
When there are couple of decks in the same local area under different ownerships, 
customers are given more choices of charging and parking their vehicles, therefore decks tend 
to compete between each other to maximize their own revenue. Decks can make decision on 
their electricity price and parking fee to fulfill different financial strategy. For instance, decks 
will apply Low-price strategy when a higher market share is desired and though price margin 
is low, net income would still be high because of the large number of sales0. In competition 
among decks, price strategy of decks’ will have influence on customers’ behavior. And as a 
Fig. 1 A parading shift: Conventional vehicle and gas station VS Electric vehicle and 
charging station 
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feedback, customers’ response to prices of decks will have an impact on decks revenue0. No 
matter what kind of financial strategy is applied to a deck, the only destination of a deck would 
be find the optimized price strategy that can make the highest profit volume. When different 
financial strategies are applied to different decks, the competition among decks will become 
complex and sophisticate. The objective of this thesis work is to help EV charging and parking 
facilities finding the optimized financial strategy (electricity selling price and parking fee) an 
maximize their revenue. Studies of the related field will also have a positive influence on the 
development and universalization of EV charging and parking facilities and thus help 
generalizing EVs and benefit the utility companies as well. 
While analyzing the proposed structure, we divided the structure into three different levels. 
The higher level energy prosumers, second level energy trading agents and customers (EV 
owners) and each layer will be discussed as in the follow sections. The proposed structure 
among utility company, EV owners and the EV charging and parking facilities is shown below 
in Fig. 2. The Utility is a representation of higher level energy prosumers0 and suppliers while 
the Decks represents the second level energy trading agents (EV charging and parking facilities) 
between the higher level and customers. The higher level energy supplier can decide the 
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electricity selling price to the second level agents while the agents will choose their electricity 
selling price to the customers and their parking fees. 
1.2.1 Higher Level Energy Prosumers 
The higher level energy prosumers are responsible for generating electricity using various 
methods such as PV cells (photovoltaic cells), wind turbine and conventional electricity 
generator which based on fossil fuel0. It is the highest energy level of our proposed system. It 
also has the responsibility of setting the electricity sell price to the second level energy trading 
agents to have a basic control of the electricity market00. The member of this level could be 
utility companies such as Virginia Electric & Power, DTE Energy and Public Service Elec & 
Gas. 
1.2.2 Second Level Energy Trading Agent 
Second level energy trading agents consists of EV charging and parking facilities whose 
responsibility is to sell electricity to EV owners and provide parking services0. They are 
capable of setting electricity selling prices to EV owners as well as parking fees. Some of these 
agents could install renewable energy generators as a method to reduce their costs since they 
Fig.2 Proposed System Structure 
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can buy less energy from the higher level prosumers. Their electricity selling price as well as 
their parking fee will response to electricity price change and the change of customer behaviors. 
Though their destination is to make profits for their own, they are acting as the interface 
between utility companies as customers. 
1.2.3 Customer Level 
The customer level is made of EV owners. They will response to electricity selling price 
and parking fee change of EV charging and parking facilities and decide where to park and 
charge their vehicles0. Customers have different preferences and behavior models, as a matter 
of regulating in the thesis and getting the simulation results, the customer behavior (their 
response to price changes of agents) needs to be classified and quantified. 
1.3. Organization 
The Introduction about the whole thesis was presented in chapter 1. In chapter 2, 
contribution of this thesis, system specifications as well as the theories and algorithms applied 
will be presented. In chapter 3, the mathematical model, the case study simulation results as 
well as the analysis will be demonstrated. The applied algorithms will also be investigated. A 
conclusion and future work will be discussed in chapter 4. 
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Chapter 2 
Problem statement 
2.1. Contributions 
Most of existing works regarding EVs and utility grid are about power allocation and peak 
shifting etc. A game theoretical way of charging EVs in a deck is proposed in [1]. Different 
charging scenarios and charging strategies are mentioned in 0. Distributed charging control of 
EVs is introduced in 0. Energy trading between Smart Grid and PEV groups is studied in 0. An 
intelligent PEV charging method that significantly reduces power system cost while 
maintaining reliability is proposed in 0. An optimized model of peak valley shifting with EV 
charging is presented in 0. 
The main contribution of this paper is listed below: 
1. We study the competition from the angle of one EV charging/parking decks and 
propose a framework that can find optimized price strategies for decks at the Nash 
Equilibrium point. 
2. We study the price competition among decks with game theory. We specify the 
properties of the problem and solve it with an appropriate game theory model. 
3. We realize that customers, according to their reactions to price changes, can be divided 
into three groups. Then we quantify the possibility of customers’ response by different 
groups so that we can forecast customers’ behaviors in simulation.
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2.2. System Specification 
In the system we assumed, all decks are capable of making their own price decision of 
both electricity price and parking fee. Being an independent and selfish entity, a deck’s goal is 
to maximize its own revenue and since in the system each deck has similar operational cost, 
decks’ profits grow as their revenue grow.  
There are 6 decks of 6 different owners in the basic system. We focus on the day-ahead 
operation of EV decks, so we assume the decks can choose to alter their electricity price and 
parking fee every hour, that is saying ∆𝑡 = 1	ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟. Fig. 3 shows the flow chart of how our 
system helps a deck to make price decision using game-theoretic algorithm. 
Fig. 3 Flowchart of the proposed game-theoretic algorithm 
 
No 
Yes 
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In this system, Nikaido-Isoda function and relaxation algorithm are applied to find the 
Nash Equilibrium point. Firstly, we have the same start point for each deck. In the simulation, 
the jump out condition 𝜀 is set to be 10-8, that is saying, when the difference between last 
decision and the next step decision is smaller than this value, the system will jump out of the 
loop and give out the value of this iteration as the final result, otherwise, the system will go on 
updating the price strategy by applying the above algorithm to the process until the terminal 
condition is satisfied. In the relaxation algorithm applied to update simulation results, the ratio 
is set to 0.5 for the simplicity of calculation. Finally, the decision for the next day’s price 
strategy and revenue for each deck at the Nash Equilibrium point is shown. 
In the following case studies of the next chapter, the convergence of a “6 decks owned by 
6 owners” system is performed. Further in the second case study, buy-in strategy and grouping 
strategy are also applied to the system as another way to improve decks’ revenue. The impact 
of different customer groups, as a factor of great influence to the game, is also studied in the 
following case study. The influence is studied by changing the customer groups’ volume while 
keeping the total customer number of each deck unchanged, which is, changing the weighting 
of different groups for each deck. 
All simulations were run on an 6th Generation Intel® Core™ i7-6700HQ Processor (6M 
Cache, up to 3.50 GHz) computer with an 8.00 GB memory. Averagely it takes 14.83 seconds 
to converge. 
2.3. Theory and Applied Algorithm 
2.3.1 Game Theory 
In this section, the concept of game theory and the algorithm needed to solve the presented 
problem will be introduced.  
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Assuming there are i=1, 2, 3…I players participating the game. Then a vector 𝑥" is used 
to present the strategy taken by the i-th player. If all the players act together, we can have a 
collective strategy set 𝑥 = {𝑥2, 𝑥5, … , 𝑥N}, we use 𝜑" to represent the payoff function of i-th 
player, which indicates the profit that i-th player can gain by taking its own strategy given a 
strategy space of others. In this paper, EV charging decks are considered players. There fore 𝜌"  denotes the price strategy (both electricity charge and parking fee) of i-th deck.	 𝑦" 𝑥  
denotes the element 𝑥2, … , 𝑥",2, 𝑦", 𝑥"R2, … , 𝑥N . This indicates that the i-th player take the 
action of 𝑦"  while the others take the action set of 𝑥2, … , 𝑥",2, 𝑥"R2, … , 𝑥N . The Nash 
equilibrium point is defined as: 𝑥∗ = 𝑥2∗, … , 𝑥N∗ , ∀𝑖																																																	(1) 𝜑" 𝑥∗ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑋" 𝑥∗ ∈Y𝜑" 𝑋" 𝑥 																																				(2) 
Where 𝑋" is the strategy space of the i-th player, in this paper, which is the price sets for 
the i-th EV charging deck. The collective strategy set is:	𝑋 = 𝑋2×𝑋5×…×𝑋N 
Therefore, if there exist a Nash equilibrium point, then, at that point, all the players subject 
to the following formula: 𝜑" 𝑥"∗ 𝑥∗ ≥ 𝜑" 𝑥" 𝑥∗ , ∀𝑖																																										(3) 
Here, (3) shows that all the players cannot improve their payoff by unilaterally changing 
its own strategy while the strategies of other players are fixed. 
2.3.2 Nikaido-Isoda Function 
In 0, the Nikaido-Isoda function which can transform the Nash equilibrium point searching 
problem to an optimization problem is introduced. 
Nikaido-Isoda function is defined as: 
𝛹 𝑥, 𝑦 = 𝜑" 𝑦" 𝑥 − 𝜑" 𝑥N"`2 																																		(4) 
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The right side of (4) represents the improvements in payoff that the i-th player will receive 
when the player changes the strategy from 𝑥" to 𝑦" while other players stick to the strategy 
set	𝑥. Thus, this function represents the sum of the improvements for all the players in regards 
to the payoff functions. 𝑥∗can be considered as the Nash normalized equilibrium point if: 𝑀𝑎𝑥 A∗& ∈c𝛹 𝑥∗, 𝑦 = 0																																										(5) 
When (5) is satisfied, none of the decks can improve their revenue by unilaterally changing 
its price while the strategies of other decks remain steady. Under certain concavity conditions, 
a Nash equilibrium point will be reached 0. In this paper, since the 𝑔 𝜌",)*, 𝜌,",)*  is a convex 
concave function, we can solve the Nash equilibrium problem by represent it by the following 
optimization problem: Z 𝑥 ＝𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥&∈cΨ 𝑥, 𝑦 	𝑥, 𝑍 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋																															(6) 
The 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 represents the argument of maximum. 
2.3.3 Relaxation Algorithm 
 The relaxation algorithm is used to update the results of the optimal response function at 
every iteration step before it converges to the Nash equilibrium point. The initial estimate is set 
as 𝑥j, which is a null vector. The relaxation algorithm could be represented as below: 𝑥>R2 = 1 − 𝜃> 𝑥> + 𝜃>𝑍 𝑥> , 0 < 𝜃> < 1																											(7) 
Where 𝑘  is the iteration number, 	𝜃>  is the weighting term at the iteration 𝑘 . The 
relaxation algorithm ensures the convergence under certain concavity conditions 00. For  sake 
of simplicity, the value of 𝜃> is set to be 0.5 and this satisfies the convergence conditions at 
the same time. Also the complete and detailed proof regarding the convergence of relaxation 
algorithm can be found in 0 of which our targeted problem meets all the sufficient conditions. 
The stopping condition is set as below: 𝑀𝑎𝑥 Ap,& ∈cΨ 𝑥>, 𝑦 < 𝜀																																											(8) 
where 𝜀 is a small value used to control the convergence rate. 
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Chapter 3 
Mathematical Model 
3.1. Problem Formulation 
In this paper, we consider a model of a local area of few EV charging/parking decks. These 
decks are capable of electricity trading with customers and utility company and providing 
parking services to customers. Being individual charging and parking facilities for EVs, their 
goals are to maximize their own revenue by changing their price variables for electricity and 
parking service[1]. Customers in this area can be divided into different groups according to 
their preferences for decks0. Characters of decks that might have an influence on customers’ 
preferences would mainly be price, location and other customized character like service attitude 
and relationship with local customers but not limited[4].  
1. We have same initial electricity and parking price for all decks. 
2. We start iteration steps in which Nikaido-Isoda function and relaxation algorithm are 
applied. 
3. We run iteration, help decks to update their price strategy until termination condition is 
satisfied. 
4. Finally, there will be a balanced point that no deck could improve its own revenue while 
others remain the same price strategy. 
The objective of the i-th EV charging/parking deck is to maximize its own revenue, which 
is consist of two individual parts: charging and parking. The objective function of i-th deck 
would be
 14 
𝑅" = 𝑅)" + 𝑅+" − 𝐶"																																																								(9) 
Where 𝑅" represents the total revenue of i-th deck, 𝑅)" and 𝑅+" represents the revenue 
for i-th deck from charging and parking portion. 𝐶" represents the daily operational cost of i-
th deck. 
1. Charging 
Customers are divided into three groups for all decks accordingly by their 
charging/parking behaviors. Table 1 shows the groups of customers, gives a description and 
example of each group. 
Table 1 Customer Groups 
Group of 
customers 
Description 
Charging: 
price 
sensitive 
Parking: 
price 
sensitive 
Examples 
A 
Consist of loyalty customers 
who will have their EV 
charged at the same deck for 
same time duration every 
day. 
No No 
Customers 
work/live in 
located area 
care more 
about 
characteristics 
like 
renewable 
energy other 
than prices. 
B 
Consists of customers who 
will park their EV at same 
deck every day but may 
change their charging time 
according to the prices. 
Yes No 
Customers 
work/live in 
located area, 
cares about 
electricity 
prices but 
unwilling to 
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Therefore the customer number by hour of each deck at time t 𝐾",)*:;<"'< 𝑡  is: 𝐾",)*:;<"'< 𝑡 = 𝑎"2 𝑡 + 𝑔 𝜌",)*, 𝜌,",)* ×𝑏" 𝑡 + 𝑐" 𝜌", 𝜌,", 𝑡 													 10  
In the formulation above, 𝑎"2 𝑡  is the number of EVs belongs to Group A getting 
charged in i-th deck in time slot t, 𝑏" 𝑡  is the number of EVs belongs to Group B parking in 
i-th deck in time slot t, 𝑐" 𝜌", 𝜌,", 𝑡  is the number of EVs belongs to Group C parking in i-th 
deck in time slot t. These numbers could be known from forecast model. The 𝑔 𝜌",)*, 𝜌,",)*   
in (10) is the influence factor of price change on customers’ behavior, which is a non-increasing 
function, when the price goes up some customers will cut down their charging time to save 
money, 𝜌",)*  represents the electricity sell price of i-th deck to its customers, 𝜌,",)* 
represents the average price of all other decks. 
For all the players, we define 𝜌",)* ∈ [𝜌2,)*, … , 𝜌N,)*]. We assume that 𝑔 𝜌",)*, 𝜌,",)*  
for all players satisfy the following properties: 
Property 1: Nonincreasing as 𝜌",)* increases. This means when price of one deck goes up 
go to another 
deck due to 
location 
variance. 
C 
Consists of customers that 
will only go to decks to 
charge their EVs and leave 
afterwards. Group C’s 
customer’s choice (which 
deck to go to) is relevant to 
i-th deck’s price	𝜌" and 
average price of other decks 𝜌,". 
Yes Yes 
Park-to-shop 
customers or 
customers 
stopping by 
for visiting. 
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while other decks not changing their prices, the customers trend not to charge their vehicle at 
this deck. 𝜕𝑔 𝜌",)*, 𝜌,",)*𝜕𝜌",)* ≤ 0																																																 11  
Property 2: Nondecreasing as 𝜌,",)* increases. This means when the price of other decks goes 
up while our deck’s price keeps constant, the customers of one deck will be more likely to 
charge their vehicle at this deck. 𝜕𝑔 𝜌",)*, 𝜌,",)*𝜕𝜌,",)* ≥ 0																																																(12) 
But as the price goes up, the increase of price trend to have less influence on the change 
of customer number choose to charge their vehicle in our deck. Thus: 𝜕5𝑔 𝜌",)*, 𝜌,",)*𝜕𝜌,",)*5 ≤ 0																																															(13) 
As stated above, we consider the utility of 𝑔 𝜌",)*, 𝜌,",)* ： 
𝑔 𝜌",)*, 𝜌,",)* = −𝜌",)*5 + 𝛼𝜌,",)* − 𝛼4 𝜌,",)*5																							(14) 
Where α is a positive integer. Same properties also apply to 𝑐" 𝜌", 𝜌,", 𝑡 . 𝑐" 𝜌", 𝜌," = 	𝜂 −0.05𝜌"5 + 𝛼𝜌," − 𝛼4 𝜌,"5 																												(15) 
Accordingly, the demand	of power 𝐷" 𝑡  , in kw for each deck would be: 𝐷" 𝑡 = 𝐾",)*:;<"'< 𝑡 ×𝑃)*:;<"'<																																												(16) 
While 𝑃)*:;<"'< is the charging power. 
The revenue of charging for i-th deck in dollar: 
𝑅)" = 𝜌",)* − 𝜌",$%&"' 𝑡 ×𝐷" 𝑡5{|`2 																																					(17) 
While 𝜌",$%&"' 𝑡  represents the electricity buy in price of ith deck, varies by time, 𝐷"(𝑡) 
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denotes the power demand in kw. 
 
2. Parking 
Formulas given above are for the EV charging revenue, and here come the ones for 
parking: 
𝑅+" = 𝐾",+:;>"'<×𝜌",+:;>"'<5{|`2 																																											(18) 
In which 𝐾",+:;>"'<  is the number of electric vehicles parking in i-th deck in time 
period	∆t: 𝐾",+:;>"'< = 𝑐" 𝜌", 𝜌,", t + 𝑎"5 𝑡 + 𝑏" 𝑡 																											(19) 
3.2. Case Studied 
3.2.1 Case Study One: Check of Convergence. 
In this case, we calculate the day-ahead value of each deck’s electricity selling price and 
parking fee for the next day. We assume that 6 decks are owned by 6 different owners and they 
compete with each other. The destination of all players (6 decks) is to maximize their own 
revenue under a set of constraints. Though total customer number for the whole day is similar, 
time distributed number and group weighting various from deck to deck, which lead to different 
price strategy of each deck. 
3.2.2 Case Study Two: Evaluate Customer Influences on decks’ 
strategies 
Since all revenue of decks we assumed come from customers and the goal of the proposed 
framework is to find maximized revenue for decks, customer would be a big factor we need to 
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study. In this case study, the influence of three groups of customers on the decks’ revenue is 
shown to provide decks with more information in decision making. 
In order study the customers’ weighting to different decks of various price strategies, a 
series of group volume changes are made as below. 
We reduced the customer number of each group of one deck (deck 6) to zero and see what 
influence it has on the other decks price strategy and revenue. 
3.2.3 Case Study Three: Evaluate Customer Influences on decks’ 
revenue 
Then we reduce Group C customers’ number of all decks by 100 and add it to their Group 
A and Group B customers to see the dependence of each deck on different customer groups.  
Apparently there could be more combinations in order to study more of the aspects of the 
influences, but we made these changes intendedly to study the relationship between decks’ 
revenue and some of the characteristics of customers from different groups such as mobility 
and charging, parking flexibility. Some changes to the customer groups may have more impacts 
on the market some may not, in order to show if there is going to be a change of the decks’ 
revenue, some studies are made to be a little bit aggressive unless influences in revenue are big 
enough to show the impact. 
3.3. Analysis 
3.3.1 Check of Convergence. 
Fig. 4 (a) shows the convergence of electricity price of all decks and Fig. 4 (b) shows the 
convergence of parking fee of all decks. All decks share same starting point for both electricity 
price and parking fee, differences start to show after first iteration as different price strategies 
are chosen by different decks. As shown in both figures, the two price strategies of each deck 
are converging to an equilibrium condition after several iterations. After 27 steps the stopping 
condition is satisfied and the system reaches a Nash Equilibrium point, at which no deck will 
be able to improve their revenue by changing their price strategy unilaterally.  
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By assigning value of customer numbers to function stated in previous section, the total 
revenue of each deck is found as shown in Fig. 4 (c). As the weighting of different customer 
group various from deck to deck and other differences in coefficients, the price strategy of each 
deck various too. For deck 1, deck 3 and deck 5, higher parking fee strategy is chosen and for 
deck 2 and deck 3 higher electricity strategy is chosen to maximize their revenue. Deck 4 and 
deck 6 applied low price strategy to both charging aspect and parking aspect so that the total 
revenue is relatively low compared to other decks, for example, deck 3. 
3.3.2 Evaluate Customer Influences on strategies 
Fig. 5 to Fig. 7 shows the after–change decks’ price strategies and decks’ revenues. More 
specifically, (a), (b), (c) in Fig. 5 shows the electricity price, parking fee and total revenue after 
Fig. 4 The convergence of parking fee of all deck 
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deck 6’s Group C customer number reduced to zero, (a), (b), (c) in Fig. 6 shows the electricity 
price, parking fee and total revenue after deck 6’s Group B customer number reduced to zero 
and (a), (b), (c) in Fig. 7 shows the electricity price, parking fee and total revenue after deck 
6’s Group A customer number reduced to zero.  
From the comparison of Fig. 5-Fig. 7 and Fig. 4 (a) (b) (c), we can easily draw the 
conclusion that Group C customer’s response to decks’ price influence the system the most, 
both to the other decks’ price strategy and revenue. Since the customers’ response to price for 
this deck would be of less flexibility, deck 6 trend to have higher price to maintain maximized 
revenue. And for Group A and B customers, they obtain lower level flexibility, so when 
changing the number of there customers, it will only have little influence on the other decks’ 
price strategy, thus the influence on the revenue for other deck would also be minor. But since 
Group B customers obtain a great volume of customer number, loosing Group B customer will 
dramatically do harm to decks’ total revenue. 
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Fig. 5 The electricity price, parking fee and total revenue after deck 6’s Group C customer 
number reduced to zero 
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Fig. 6 The electricity price, parking fee and total revenue after deck 6’s Group B 
customer number reduced to zero 
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3.3.3 Evaluate Customer Influences on revenues 
When we add the 100 customers reduced from Group C to Group B customers, all decks 
trend to gain more profit by different number, but deck 1, 2, 3, 6 will gain less profit compared 
to adding the number to Group A customers, which is shown in Fig. 8 (a), (b), (c). In (a), (b) 
and (c) shown in Fig. 9, we add the reduced 100 customers from Group C to Group A customers. 
From the figure it can be seen that all decks price strategy trend to get higher when compared 
to the first case study. The reason might be when there is less Group C customers, decks can 
have higher price for electricity and parking without taking the risk of losing big amount of 
customers. As for the revenue, revenue of deck 1, 2, 3, 6 increased because of higher electricity 
Fig. 7 The electricity price, parking fee and total revenue after deck 6’s Group A 
customer number reduced to zero 
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price as well as more parking services are needed. Deck 4, 5 will lose some profit when 
compared to the first case study. 
           
 
Overall, we draw the general conclusion that the impact customer behavior has on decks’ 
strategies and revenue proportion grows with the flexibility when customer choosing a deck to 
charge and park their vehicle, and the impact customer behavior has on decks’ revenue absolute 
value grows with the inflexibility when customers are choosing a deck to charge and park their 
EVs. 
Fig. 8 The electricity price, parking fee and total revenue after all decks’ Group C 
customer number reduced 100 and added to Group B 
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Chapter 4 
Conclusion and future work 
In the upcoming future, it can be foreseen that Electric Vehicles are about to take more 
responsibilities in transportation system and therefore its contribution in improving utility grid 
will be more significant. Researches in the EVs as well as EV charging/parking facilities will 
undoubtedly help improve the development of the not so well constructed EV market.  
In order to keep up with the evolution undergoing in the field of electric vehicle and power 
grid, relationships of different game players would need to be modified or even redefined. With 
the awareness of the changes and the proper definition of roles of different players in the 
market, we can boost up the steps as well s benefit more from the evolution. 
In this paper, we modified the competition between decks into mathematical model. Then 
we summarized it, transformed it into optimization problem and solved it with game theoretic 
method. In the case study, we help decks find the Nash Equilibrium point and their individual 
ideal price strategy at the Nash Equilibrium point. Moreover, we consider the influence from 
different groups of customers on the revenue of decks, according to which decks may apply 
various strategies to manage their customer weighting so as to optimize their revenue. 
In the future, Intelligent Transport System would be a potential factor to carry the study as 
another influence on the customers’ response from the decks. And as another operation method, 
real-time decision making could be applied to be compared against day-ahead operation. As 
the number of EV customers grows, constraints such as the number of EV
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charging outlets as well as parking spots in a deck need to be considered. We will also extend 
our system to various location based environment such as urban area and rural area to specify 
location effect and universalize our system. 
